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The purpose of the studies reported in this paper was to evaluate the 
function of counterfactual thinking (CT) in depression. In Experi-
ment 1, depressed and non-depressed participants were asked to 
imagine themselves as the protagonist of a hypothetical situation, 
and to think counterfactually about three different scenarios. The 
results showed that there was a similar CT style (in terms of direc-
tion, structure and focus of mutation) for the depressed and the non-
depressed groups. It was also found that the perceived preparation 
for a future similar situation increased after CT and, contrary to our 
hypotheses, this effect was observed in both groups. In Experiment 
2, a real-life situation was used (a course examination) in which par-
ticipants experienced a negative outcome (a poor score on the test). 
Again, it was observed that depressed and non-depressed participants 
showed the same CT style, but non-depressed participants were more 
likely to use CT spontaneously. In addition, the second study showed 
further differences between the two groups: depressed participants 
not only showed a lack of cognitive beneﬁ ts from thinking coun-
terfactually (i.e., after CT they do not feel more prepared for future 
similar events, nor able to avoid a similar bad outcome, in contrast to 
the non-depressed participants), but also show a lack of behavioural 
changes (both intentions to change and actual changes over the sub-
sequent week). In conclusion, these results provide evidence about 
the function of CT both in depressed and in non-depressed think-
ing, and highlight both the similarities and differences for these two 
groups. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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in depression. We agree with Roese and Olson 
(1995a, p.626) when they said, ‘depression and 
other dysphoric states may be associated not 
with preparative thinking but with afunctional, 
perhaps even dysfunctional, rumination’. However, 
although there is an increasing accumulation of 
evidence in support of the importance of rumi-
nation in depression and other psychopathology 
(e.g., Harvey, Watkins, Mansell, & Shafran, 2004; 
Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000), there is little or no empiri-
cal support in the literature for this hypothesis spe-
ciﬁ cally in relation to the putative function of CT 
in depression. 
INTRODUCTION
The aim of this research was to begin to under-
stand the function of counterfactual thinking (CT) 
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There is now a considerable literature on the rela-
tionship between thinking and depression that has 
accumulated over several decades, and that repre-
sents several different approaches to the relationship 
between thinking and depression (e.g., see Power & 
Champion, 1986; Power & Dalgleish, 2008). Some 
of these approaches were developed solely in the 
clinical context (e.g., Beck, 1976) and therefore show 
a lack of integration of the most recent advances 
in cognitive psychology. These clinical-based 
approaches typically present an inappropriate 
view of, for example, reasoning in ordinary healthy 
individuals, and, consequently, can fail to see simi-
larities as well as differences between reasoning in 
depression and reasoning in non-depressed indi-
viduals (see Champion & Power, 1995; Power & 
Champion, 1986; Power & Wykes, 1996; Quelhas & 
Power, 1991), or of reasoning in schizophrenia (e.g., 
Quelhas, 1987). Just to give an example, the idea 
that healthy non-depressed individuals reason in a 
logical way (e.g., see proposals by Beck, 1976, in the 
case of depression; Arieti, 1974 and Matte-Blanco, 
1976, in the case of schizophrenia) leads to the incor-
rect view that reasoning performance by compari-
son is almost always biased in such patients.
In contrast to the clinically based views of distor-
tion and bias in depression, Alloy and Abramson 
(1979) introduced a contrasting switch in the general 
assumption of cognitive distortions in depression. 
Based on a series of studies that employed a con-
tingency judgment task, they observed that mildly 
depressed students were more accurate and more 
realistic than non-depressed controls. Non-depressed 
participants showed a positive bias when judging 
that they had control over positive outcomes where 
in fact the control was illusory, whereas depressed 
participants in the absence of such bias were more 
realistic. Alloy and Abramson (1979) termed this 
phenomenon ‘depressive realism’. In relation to these 
opposite views of depressive bias versus depressive 
realism, we have argued previously that both effects 
of apparent bias and of apparent realism are observ-
able depending on different circumstances, task 
conditions and so on (e.g., Power, 1991; Power & 
Dalgleish, 2008). For example, depressed individu-
als are likely to be more ‘realistic’ or accurate when 
rejecting false positive information and accepting 
true negative information, but more ‘biased’ when 
rejecting true positive information and accepting 
false negative information. Quelhas and Power 
(1991), in a study with a linear syllogism task, in 
which the valence of the information was manipu-
lated, found that normal and anxious groups were 
signiﬁ cantly better at the positive syllogisms than at 
the negative, whereas the depressed group showed 
equal performance for both kinds of positive and 
negative problems. However, the fact that Quelhas 
and Power (1991) did not ﬁ nd a negative bias for the 
depressed group could have been due to the use of 
a mildly depressed student sample, as in the classic 
Alloy and Abramson (1979) study, instead of using 
severely depressed clinical individuals.
In summary, what we wish to call attention to in 
the area of cognitive psychopathology is the need 
for awareness of the advances in cognitive psy-
chology and cognitive science. It is not possible to 
understand, for example, distortions in reasoning 
without knowing how ordinary healthy individu-
als reason, nor without considering how distor-
tions are moderated by context. In fact, the study 
of CT is one of the areas where such an interaction 
is clearly plausible. However, despite the fact that 
CT has a considerable effect on people’s expectan-
cies, intentions and emotions (e.g., Roese & Olson, 
1995b), there is very little known about the conse-
quences of CT in the context of emotional disor-
ders like depression. In the next section therefore, 
we present the main ﬁ ndings from the area of CT 
and advance a theoretical speculation about the 
(a)functionality of counterfactuals in the case of 
depressed individuals.
Counterfactual thoughts about what might have 
been, if only something might happen in a differ-
ent way, are very common when something unde-
sirable happens (e.g., ‘If I had taken the usual route 
for work, I would have avoided the car accident’). 
Mainly in the domain of socio-cognition, psy-
chologists have been interested in understanding 
the cognitive, social, motivational and emotional 
consequences of such thoughts (for a review see, 
for example, Roese, 2005; Roese & Olson, 1995b). 
More recent work, based on mental models theory 
(e.g., Byrne, 1996, 1997; see also Byrne, 2005, for a 
review in this domain; Johnson-Laird, 2006), has 
also drawn attention to the need to consider the 
types of mental representations and cognitive pro-
cesses involved in CT. In relation to the function 
of counterfactual thought, Roese (1994) has drawn 
attention to two different functions that depend 
on the so-called direction of the thoughts: ﬁ rst, 
thoughts with an upward direction, that is, coun-
terfactuals about how the situation could have 
resulted in a better or improved state of affairs; and 
second, thoughts with a downward direction, that 
is, counterfactuals about how the situation could 
have turned out worse than it did. According to 
Roese, upward counterfactuals serve a prepara-
tory function in that identiﬁ cation of the cause of 
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a negative outcome or some other factor that could 
have avoided the unfortunate situation (Mandel, 
2003; Mandel & Lehman, 1996) and imagining how 
things could have been better, may prepare us for 
future similar situations. On the other hand, down-
ward counterfactuals are considered to serve an 
affective function (the comparison between what 
happens in fact, and how things could have been 
worse, should help people to feel better). Accord-
ing to Roese and Olson (1997) upward counter-
factuals are more useful because they point to 
improvements in the status quo, whereas down-
ward counterfactuals point to the maintenance of 
the status quo.
In general, people generate more upward coun-
terfactuals, but it seems that when they are in a 
good mood they generate downward ones in addi-
tion (e.g., Sanna, Turley-Ames, & Meier, 1999). So, 
should we expect that depressed individuals make 
more upward counterfactuals? And if they do, will 
those thoughts serve a preparatory function, as 
observed in the case of non-depressed individuals? 
Or should we expect that ‘.  .  .  dysphoric individu-
als may intentionally consider downward possi-
bilities in order to make themselves feel better’, 
as Roese and Olson (1995c, p.38) stated? We will 
return to these possibilities later.
One of the underlying mechanisms of CT is causal 
inference. Identifying the cause responsible for a 
negative outcome is useful because it may help 
to avoid a future negative outcome in a similar 
situation (Roese & Olson, 1997). Counterfactual 
thoughts generally suggest successful future 
action and, consequently, contribute to enhanced 
expectancies of personal efﬁ cacy, personal control 
and conﬁ dence in general (McMullen, Markman, 
& Gavanski, 1995). In this account the beneﬁ ts of 
CT are narrowly bounded to vision of a success-
ful future, where a capable agent executes actions 
in order to enhance performance. However, in 
depression, people do not see themselves as 
capable rather as inept, weak, defective and hope-
less about their personal future (e.g., Beck, Rush, 
Shaw, & Emery, 1979). They tend to identify causes 
of negative outcomes, features of their own faulty 
personality or diseased body. The dark picture of 
a negative self-image is completed by the convic-
tion that they do not have the necessary attributes 
to reach success in the future (Beck et al., 1979; 
Kovács & Beck, 1978). 
It seems plausible that individuals who have a 
chronic negative view of future events may not 
elaborate the same kind of performance-enhancing 
strategies in their counterfactual thoughts as people 
who do not suffer depression. The process might 
be compromised at the beginning. To enhance 
performance and avoid future negative outcome, 
the right cause must be identiﬁ ed for a particu-
lar consequence. Nevertheless, depressed people 
show a consistent bias in their causal attributions 
(Seligman, Abramson, Semmel, & von Baeyer, 
1979; Sweeney, Anderson, & Bailey, 1986; Weary 
& Edwards, 1994). Individuals with a depressive 
attributional style, when confronted with a nega-
tive outcome tend to identify causes that they per-
ceive as uncontrollable, internal, stable and global. 
In other words, depressed people frequently per-
ceive the causes of negative events as features of 
their character or native abilities. Thinking coun-
terfactually about features that cannot be easily 
changed has no cognitive or behavioural beneﬁ t. 
It may even become self-defeating when a coun-
terfactual related negative emotion like guilt 
is erroneously directed to the self (Alicke, 2000; 
Davis, Lehman, Silver, Wortman, & Ellard, 1996; 
Janoff-Bulman, 1979; Sherman & McConnell, 1995). 
This scenario is most likely to occur in severely 
depressed individuals whose motivation may be 
low to seek for control in different aspects of their 
lives. Individuals who suffer from high levels of 
depression frequently believe that there is nothing 
that they can do to change their outcomes (Marsh 
& Weary, 1994). The perception of almost total lack 
of control may result in feelings of hopelessness, in 
passivity, and in social isolation (Abramson et al., 
2002). Nevertheless, at lower levels of depression 
the generalized concerns about control may result 
in heightened control motivation (e.g., Weary, 
Elbin, & Hill, 1987). In terms of CT, as Markman 
and Weary (1998) have shown, attempts to render 
the social environment more controllable and pre-
dictable yield an enhanced tendency to engage in 
controllable CT, and individuals experience an 
increase in the retrospective perception of control. 
However, in a recent study, Markman and Miller 
(2006) found that individuals who endorse a rela-
tively mild-to-moderate depressive symptom level 
gain no psychological beneﬁ t from focusing on how 
they could have prevented a negative outcome. It 
seems that with an increase in depression level, 
upward counterfactuals become more and more 
dysfunctional, that is, more uncontrollable and 
more characterological in the Janoff-Bulman (1979) 
sense, in which guilt is related to aspects of the self 
and actions by the self.
Our main interest in the present studies is to 
evaluate the possible function of CT in depres-
sion. In a previous study that used hypothetical 
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scenarios (Juhos, Quelhas, & Senos, 2003), and in 
which we were interested in counterfactual style 
and feelings of preparation, we found that dys-
phoric and non-dysphoric participants endorsed 
the same kind of counterfactual thoughts: upward 
direction, with a subtractive structure and a self-
referent focus of mutation. We also observed that 
after CT participants reported that they feel more 
prepared for future similar situations in compari-
son with participants who thought factually about 
the same scenario. What was surprising was that 
we observed similar results for both dysphoric 
and non-dysphoric participants, in relation to the 
perception of feelings of preparation following the 
process of engaging in CT. The fact that we did not 
observe any differences between dysphoric and 
non-dysphoric participants leads to the hypothesis 
that these results could be a consequence of the 
sample used (dysphoric students instead of clini-
cal patients), or the possibility of a methodologi-
cal problem with the approach used (e.g., that the 
scenarios were not sufﬁ ciently engaging). In an 
attempt therefore to clarify the possible functional 
and dysfunctional implications of counterfactuals 
at the emotional and at the cognitive levels, we 
carried out the two following experiments in order 
to test a number of these interpretations.
EXPERIMENT 1
In this experiment, participants were given three 
different scenarios to induce CT, in order to evalu-
ate if CT could be moderated by the context of a 
story. We also gave a number of questions to par-
ticipants in order to evaluate the following aspects 
of the story: the perceived control of the situation; 
the direction of CT; the affect associated with CT; 
the perceived preparation for future similar situa-
tions; and the perceived valence of the result. Our 
aim was to compare depressed and non-depressed 
participants’ counterfactual thoughts and their cog-
nitive and affective consequences. Our prediction 
was that the two groups would not differ in the 
kind of counterfactual thoughts made, but would 
differ in the consequences of thinking counter-
factually (e.g., for depressed participants we pre-
dicted a lack of preparative beneﬁ t from engaging 
in upward CT).
Sample
From a population of 439 students of the ﬁ rst year 
of psychology at the Instituto Superior de Psico-
logia Aplicada (ISPA; Lisbon), we chose a sample 
based on the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI) 
results of 124 students (94 female, 30 male). The 
average age in the sample was mean (M) = 19.7; 
standard deviation (SD) = 3.5. Seventy participants 
who endorsed minimum BDI scores constituted 
the non-depressed group (M = 0.5; SD = 0.5) and 54 
individuals who scored more than 14 formed the 
depressed group (M = 19.7; SD = 5.2).
Together with the BDI, we used the Spielberger 
State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI Form Y-1) 
in order to assess individuals with high levels of 
anxiety among the depressed group. However, 
given the correlation (r = 0.56; p < 0.05) between 
the results on BDI and STAI, it was not possible 
to obtain a depressed group with low levels of 
anxiety.
Materials
We constructed three stories with different scenar-
ios, but with the same structure. The structure of 
each story was: ﬁ rst paragraph is the introduction 
that gives the idea of the scenario; second para-
graph is a ﬁ rst antecedent in which the protagonist 
of the story has control, i.e., something happens 
that is a consequence of the protagonist’s decision; 
third paragraph is a second antecedent in which 
the protagonist has no control; and the fourth para-
graph is the consequent, i.e., something unpleas-
ant happens that is not very drastic, in order that 
people can think about how things could have 
been better or worse.
The complete stories can be seen in Appendix A. 
Story 1 is about two students making love without 
using a condom; Story 2 is about a student who 
failed to get an important paper to study for an 
examination; and Story 3 is about a relationship 
separation during the summer in order to test the 
strength of the relationship. 
We used each story in two different tasks: a 
thought-listing task and an evaluation task. In both 
of the tasks the story was followed by an instruction 
that was designed to produce CT. In the thought-
listing task, participants were invited to write down 
their thoughts about how things could have been 
different, if something had happened in a different 
way. In the evaluation task participants provided 
answers to questions about the perceived control 
in the situation; the CT direction (upward versus 
downward); the affect associated with the CT (nega-
tive–positive; feeling bad–feeling well; sad–happy); 
the perceived preparation for similar future situa-
tions; and the perceived valence of the result.
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Procedure
Data were collected in groups, in three classrooms. 
Each participant carried out both of the tasks (the 
thought-listing task and the evaluation task) with 
each of the stories. The order of the stories was con-
stant and the order of tasks was counterbalanced. 
At the end of the block they were given the STAI 
Y-1 and the BDI.
Results Analysis
For the results analysis we have eliminated the 
outliers. The analysis of the direction of the CT was 
based on results obtained when participants had to 
write down their thoughts.
We also have an analysis based on the partici-
pant’s CT type. This is a variable that we created 
that was based on the kind of CT direction pro-
duced, with four levels: no CT; only downward 
CT (downward style); upward and downward 
CT (mixed style); and only upward CT (upward 
style).
In general, participants produced more upward 
than downward CT (F[1, 115] = 88.98; p < 0.001). 
This main effect of CT direction is qualiﬁ ed by two 
variables: the level of depression and the given 
order of material. Non-depressed participants 
gave more upward than downward CT (F[1, 115] = 
92.24; p < 0.001), but so did depressed participants 
(F[1, 115] = 16.31; p < 0.001). However, upward 
CTs were more frequent with non-depressed than 
with depressed participants (F[1,115] = 9.20; p < 
0.001), whereas with downward CT there were no 
signiﬁ cant differences.
Related with the order of the material, it was pos-
sible to see that participants produced more down-
ward CTs when they received the stories with the 
questions ﬁ rst, followed by the stories with space 
to write their thoughts, than in the reverse order 
(F[1, 115] = 7.19; p < 0.01).
All analyses above were made with frequencies 
of upward and downward CT. And all analyses 
below were made with the CT type. So, as inde-
pendent variables we have: depression; CT type; 
and kind of story (a repeated measure), and each 
dependent variable (associated affect; preparative 
function; perceived control; result valence) being 
analysed separately in order to examine the effects 
of these factors.
In relation to the associated affect, the three items 
of this question were well correlated (with group 
Cronbach alphas for the items between 0.90 and 
0.93), so we used the mean values for the analyses. 
We obtained only a main effect of CT type (F[3, 77] 
= 4.70; p < 0.01), that is, upward CT was found to be 
associated with a more negative affect than were 
all the other CT types.
Regarding preparative function, we found a main 
effect of the Story (F[2, 218] = 7.57; p < 0.001). Partic-
ipants thought that they would be more prepared 
for future similar situations for all three stories 
because all means were above 4 (on a seven-point 
scale). However, they felt more prepared in the 
case of Story 1, than with the other stories (F[2, 
218] = 7.57; p < 0.001). Unfortunately, it is difﬁ cult 
to draw any ﬁ rm conclusions about the differences 
between the stories because the stories were pre-
sented in a ﬁ xed order so as to ease administra-
tion to different size groups of students, when the 
stories preferably should have been counterbal-
anced for order. So, this main effect could be due 
to the Story content or to the fact that it was the 
Story order effect.
In relation to the perceived control variable, we 
found a main effect related to the Story (F[2, 216] 
= 23.70; p < 0.001). More control was perceived for 
Story 1 than for Story 2 (F[1, 108] = 9.97; p < 0.001); 
and for Story 2 than for Story 3 (F[1, 108] = 14.96; 
p < 0.001). There is also a marginal effect related 
to the CT type (F[3, 108] = 2.22; p < 0.09), in which 
there is a trend towards downward CT type being 
related to lower control. Comparing this group 
with individuals with an upward CT type we have 
(F[1, 108] = 3,86; p < 0.05). Considering that it is a 
one-tailed prediction, we can divide the p value 
by two, and we get a clearly signiﬁ cant difference 
(p < 0.026). In sum, we can say that the upward CT 
type is associated with greater perceived control 
than the downward CT type.
Finally, in relation to the result valence, we found 
an interaction between the CT style and depression 
(F[3, 110] = 2.85; p < 0.04). There was a signiﬁ cant 
difference between depressed and non-depressed 
participants, within downward CT style (F[1, 110] 
= 7.52; p < 0.01): depressed participants rated the 
consequences of the stories to be more negative 
than non-depressed participants rated them.
In sum, Experiment 1 showed that depressed and 
non-depressed participants tend to generate more 
upward than downward counterfactual thoughts 
overall, but that upward thoughts were even more 
frequent with non-depressed than with depressed 
participants (F[1, 115] = 9.20; p < 0.001), whereas 
with downward CT there was no signiﬁ cant 
difference.
We also found that an upward CT type is asso-
ciated with greater perceived control than down-
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ward CT type, which is congruent with Roese and 
Olson’s (1995a) idea that upward counterfactuals 
are more frequent following controllable outcomes, 
and downward counterfactuals are more frequent 
following uncontrollable outcomes. 
On the other hand, it was observed that depressed 
people found the results of the stories to be more 
negative than non-depressed people did. Unfor-
tunately, however, this study did not allow for 
the detection of differences between depressed and 
non-depressed participants in relation to the per-
ceived preparation for a future similar situation, 
after engaging in CT. In Experiment 2 therefore, we 
changed some methodological aspects of the study 
with the aim of improving our understanding of 
the function of CT in depression.
EXPERIMENT 2
In this second experiment, a number of method-
ological problems were obviated from the ﬁ rst 
study. The second experiment also substituted 
the use of hypothetical scenarios for a real situa-
tion, that of college examinations, in which par-
ticipants could experience failure. The idea was 
to prevent the emotional distancing that can occur 
when people think about a hypothetical scenario, 
or the temporal distancing that can occur when 
they think about something bad that has happened 
in the past (the two situations normally used in CT 
studies). Also, the evaluation of CT consequences 
in the second experiment included not only the 
cognitive level but the behavioural level as well. 
In this more realistic approach, participants were 
asked to think counterfactually about something 
that had just happened to them after they received 
a poor score in a college examination. The aim was 
to analyse whether or not depressed mood state in 
some participants altered the effects of CT in rela-
tion to: emotions (general emotions: feeling good/
bad; positive and negative speciﬁ c emotions), cog-
nitions (feelings of preparation; feelings of being 
able to avoid a future negative result; intensity of 
intentions to change behavioural patterns), and 
behaviours (post-counterfactual changes in actual 
behaviour).
Method
Sample
Depressed and non-depressed participants 
were selected from a new pool of undergraduates 
at ISPA (Lisbon) that participated in the data col-
lection protocol that included the BDI-II. A total of 
63 students, 51 female and 12 male, were recruited 
to participate. Those with BDI-II scores between 0 
and 5 were chosen for the non-depressed control 
group (n = 40; BDI-II M = 3.08; SD = 1.63) and 
the depressed group were selected as those with a 
BDI-II score of 17 or more following guidelines for 
the BDI-II of a score over 16 being likely to indicate 
depression in contrast to the slightly lower score 
used in the ﬁ rst experiment that was based on the 
ﬁ rst version of the BDI (n = 23; BDI-II M = 18.95; 
SD = 1.58). In addition, the two groups excluded 
all students who had received a positive grade on 
the academic test, because this group were not of 
the same level of interest as the ‘objective failure’ 
group.
Procedure
Depressed and non-depressed undergradu-
ates, who obtained a negative grade on an aca-
demic training test, were asked to write down 
ﬁ ve spontaneous thoughts regarding the negative 
event, immediately after receiving the poor result. 
Afterwards, they were induced to think counter-
factually about how things could have been dif-
ferent. As dependent measures, we used general 
and speciﬁ c emotions. We also measured feelings 
of preparation and feelings of capability of pre-
vention of future similar events. Emotions were 
measured before the test, after the test, and after 
processing the situation counterfactually. Feelings 
of preparation and of capability of prevention were 
measured before and after counterfactual genera-
tion. As a third dependent variable, we measured 
the intensity of intentions to carry out preventa-
tive behaviours. A week after the ﬁ rst phase of 
the study, whether or not preventative behaviours 
had actually occurred was then evaluated. Figure 
1 provides an overview of the key points for data 
collection.
Material
The material used in the study consisted of a 
booklet that contained the following: questions 
about general emotional state, rating scales for the 
intensity of speciﬁ c emotions, for the feelings of 
preparation and the perceived capability of avoid-
ing, and for behavioural intentions (ﬁ rst observa-
tion); in addition, there was also space for a list 
spontaneous thoughts (see more detailed descrip-
tion of material in Appendix B).
A week after the ﬁ rst observation, participants 
responded to a three-item questionnaire. We used 
the same items as on page 9 of the ﬁ rst question-
358 A. C. Quelhas et al.
Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Clin. Psychol. Psychother. 15, 352–365 (2008)
DOI: 10.1002/cpp
naire (see Appendix B), but this time participants 
evaluated changes in their behavioural patterns, 
that is, whether or not they had studied harder, 
worked harder in some other ways or used the 
course programme more than before the academic 
test. Nine-point rating scales were used for partici-
pants to respond.
Results
The ﬁ ve key areas analysed in this study were as 
follows: counterfactual style used in response to 
the exam failure; spontaneous counterfactual gen-
eration; the effects of CT on emotions, both general 
emotions and speciﬁ c emotions; the effects of coun-
terfactual generation on cognition, both feelings of 
preparation and feelings of ability to avoid future 
negative outcomes; and the effects of counterfac-
tual generation on behavioural intentions and 
behaviour.
Counterfactual Style
Depression had no effect on counterfactual style. 
All of the observed counterfactuals had an upward 
direction and additional structure. Most of the 
participants, irrespective of their depression level, 
focused on controllable action (non-depressed 
group: 100%; depressed group: 98%).
Spontaneous Counterfactual Generation 
Differences between the two groups for spontane-
ous counterfactual generation were analysed based 
on the proportion of counterfactuals among the 
thoughts listed after receiving the negative grade 
(number of counterfactuals/number of thoughts 
listed). The variable in question is not normally 
distributed, therefore the Mann–Whitney U-test 
was used. The results showed that depressed indi-
viduals have less tendency to activate counterfac-
tual thoughts after experiencing a negative event 
in comparison with non-depressed individuals (Z 
= −2.08; p < 0.04).
Participants with spontaneous counterfactual 
thoughts (that is, participants that made CT before 
they were ask to think counterfactually) were 
excluded from all the subsequent steps of analysis. 
Note that after participants listed their spontane-
ous thoughts their cognitions and emotions were 
evaluated, in addition to after listing their coun-
terfactual thoughts. Therefore, the ﬁ rst measures 
for cognitions and emotions were used as baseline 
comparisons for the equivalent measures taken 
after participants thought counterfactually, which 
is why it was necessary to exclude individuals who 
made CT at the ﬁ rst step.
Effects of CT on Emotions
General Emotions. For this analysis we used a 2 
(depressed–not depressed) × 3 (time point of obser-
vation) × 2 (general emotion type) repeated mea-
sures analysis of variance (ANOVA). We found a 
signiﬁ cant interaction between the time point of 
observation and the general emotion type (F[2, 104] 
= 16.25; p < 0.001). In general, participants showed 
a better mood before the test situation than after, 
and they recovered their mood at least partly after 
engaging in CT. If the two groups of participants 
are analysed separately, the same pattern is found 
for depressed and non-depressed participants.
Speciﬁ c Emotions. For this analysis we used a 
2 (depressed–not depressed) × 3 (time point of 
observation) × 12 (emotion-speciﬁ c) repeated mea-
sures ANOVA. Results revealed the main effect of 
emotion (F[11, 187] = 7.89; p < 0.001) that can be 
observed in Figure 2.
As can be seen in Figure 2, positive emotions tend 
to dominate, and among these emotions Hope is 
Exam
(negative grade)
1st evaluation of 
emotional state
Free thought listing
(5 thoughts)
1st evaluation of 
cognitions
(preparation/capability 
to avoiding)
Induction of 
counterfactual 
thinking
2nd evaluation of 
cognitions
2nd evaluation of 
emotional state
3 rd evaluation of 
Evaluation of 
behavioral intentions
Evaluation of 
behavioral changes
BDI-II
Time
emotional state
Figure 1. Time line of the procedure in Experiment 2
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the strongest one. However, the results reveal an 
interaction between the time point of observation 
(time) and the type of emotion. Planned compari-
sons demonstrate the effect of time after the test for 
Disappointment (which increases, F[1, 17] = 13.15; 
p < 0.001), Regret (increases, F(1,17) = 8.59; p < .01) 
Self-realization (which decreases, F[1, 17] = 12.66; p 
< 0.001) and Satisfaction (decreases, F[1, 17] = 12.07; 
p < 0.001). Planned comparisons also demonstrated 
the effect for time after counterfactual, showing that 
the induced CT had a signiﬁ cant effect on Shame 
(decreases, F[1, 17] = 6.701; p < 0.02) and Satisfaction 
(increases, F[1,17] = 6.427; p < 0.02). There were no 
differences between depressed and non-depressed 
participants with regard to the changes of intensity 
of speciﬁ c emotions over time.
Effects of Counterfactual Generation on Cognition
There were a considerable number of partici-
pants who had justiﬁ cations for feeling prepared 
and/or for feeling able to avoid a similar nega-
tive result in the future that had nothing to do 
with their CT. These participants were excluded 
from the following analyses so that the focus is on 
changes in cognition following CT.
Feeling Prepared for Next Time. For this analysis a 2 
(depressed–not depressed) × 2 (time point of obser-
vation) repeated measures ANOVA was used. 
There was a main effect of time point of observa-
tion (F[1, 41] = 4.94; p < 0.03). The participants felt 
more prepared for future similar situations after 
engaging in CT than they did before. However, 
this pattern was signiﬁ cantly stronger for non-
depressed participants; thus, planned comparisons 
conﬁ rm that, after counterfactual generation, non-
depressed persons felt more prepared for the future 
(F[1, 41] = 8.55; p < 0.01) but depressed persons did 
not beneﬁ t signiﬁ cantly from the preparative effect 
of CT (F[1, 41] = 0.37; NS). 
Being Able to Avoid Negative Results in the Future. For 
this analysis a 2 (depressed–not depressed) × 2 
(time point of observation) repeated measures 
ANOVA was used. There was a main effect of 
time point of observation (F[1, 36] = 4.46; p < 
0.04). The participants felt more able to avoid a 
negative result in the future after processing the 
situation counterfactually. However, there are dif-
ferent patterns for depressed and non-depressed 
participants in relation to post-counterfactual feel-
ings of preparation. Planned comparisons conﬁ rm 
that non-depressed individuals feel more able to 
avoid a future negative result after CT (F[1, 36] 
= 5.51; p < 0.02), but depressed participants again 
did not show a signiﬁ cant effect (F[1, 36] = 0.083; 
NS). When the two groups were compared ﬁ rst 
in the pre-counterfactual situation and then in the 
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post-counterfactual situation no differences were 
found (F[1, 36] = 0.085, NS; and F[1, 36] = 0.685, 
NS, respectively). 
In sum, the results show that after CT non-
depressed participants felt more prepared for 
future similar situations, and more able to avoid 
future similar negative outcomes than before 
CT, but neither of these effects was found with 
depressed participants.
Effects of Counterfactual Generation on Behaviour
The participants evaluated eight behavioural 
intentions as follows: to study more; to work 
harder; to guide study by the course program; to 
hope for easier questions in the future; to be calmer 
during the test; to clarify doubts by asking the 
teacher; to use a different study method; and to be 
more attentive during the test.
A 2 (depressed–not depressed) × 8 (type of inten-
tion) ANOVA of repeated measures was used to 
analyse the results. The analysis showed a main 
effect of type of intention (F[7, 371] = 42.28, p < 
0.001). As can be seen in Figure 3, the item with the 
lowest intention is the one that refers to ‘easier test 
questions’, which are out of the control of the indi-
vidual. The ANOVA also showed that depression 
does not moderate these intentions but showed 
a non-signiﬁ cant interaction (F[7, 371] = 1.07; 
p < 0.38). 
A week after the test, the participants were asked 
if they noted changes in their actual behaviour 
with regard to three items: studying, working and 
guiding study by the course program. The par-
ticipants used a nine-point rating scale to evalu-
ate the items, where 1 corresponded to ‘I did it 
in the same way’ and 9 ‘I did it a lot more’. A 
2 (depressed–not depressed) × 3 (behaviour type) 
ANOVA of repeated measures did not show any 
differences (F[2, 118] = 0.45; p < 0.64). There was no 
difference of any kind between the depressed and 
non-depressed participants.
The correlations were also checked between 
intentions and actual behavioural changes. The 
depressed group showed much lower correlations 
than the non-depressed group. In the depressed 
group there was no signiﬁ cant correlation between 
intentions and behavioural changes (study r = 0.02; 
work r = 0.25; use program r = 0.39), but non-
depressed subjects, who intended to work harder 
were more likely overall to convert their intentions 
into actual behaviour (study r = 0.27; work r = 0.49; 
p < 0.05; use program r = 0.24).
GENERAL DISCUSSION
In both studies presented here, as well as in a 
previous study (Juhos et al., 2003), an identical 
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CT style has been found for depressed and non-
depressed participants. What we have called CT 
style is deﬁ ned by several characteristics of such 
thoughts, for example, their direction (upward or 
downward), their structure (additive or subtrac-
tive), their focus of mutation etc. The form of each 
characteristic may change between the different 
studies (e.g., in the Juhos et al., 2003), experiment 
a dominant subtractive structure was obtained, 
whereas in the second experiment in the present 
paper a dominant additive structure was obtained), 
but these changes are always in the same direction 
for the depressed and the non-depressed samples. 
Hence, when CT is activated, both depressed and 
non-depressed participants show an identical form 
for such thoughts. 
Another interesting point for comparison between 
the two groups is related to the spontaneous acti-
vation of CT. Our second experiment allowed 
an analysis of spontaneous CT, because prior to 
participants being induced to think counterfactu-
ally about how things could have been different, 
they were asked to write down ﬁ ve spontaneous 
thoughts about the real negative event that they 
had just experienced (failure in their course exam-
ination). Results showed a signiﬁ cant difference 
between the two groups in that non-depressed par-
ticipants showed a greater tendency towards spon-
taneous counterfactual generation in comparison 
to depressed participants. In sum, the results show 
that although depressed and non-depressed par-
ticipants have an identical CT style non-depressed 
participants show a greater tendency for the spon-
taneous activation of this kind of thought (Experi-
ment 2).
These observations do not ﬁ t the idea that 
mildly depressed individuals intentionally con-
sider downward possibilities in order to make 
themselves feel better as Roese and Olson (1995c, 
p.38) supposed, nor the idea that they are more 
prone to do CT of an upward direction, or even 
that they have a propensity for CT (Monroe, Skow-
ronski, MacDonald, & Wood, 2005). Nevertheless, 
Kocovski, Endler, Rector, and Flett (2005) found 
that individuals high in social anxiety recorded 
more upward counterfactual thoughts than those 
low in social anxiety. It would be interesting to 
investigate if this result is mediated by the kind 
of anxiety, or if it could be generalized, because 
in the latter case, and given the association of 
depression with anxiety, a similar effect should be 
found in depression. But our results do not exclude 
the hypothesis of Monroe et al. (2005) that when 
depressed individuals engage in CT, it could con-
tribute to heightened feelings of regret. That could 
be another aspect of the dysfunctional role of CT 
in depression that matches with the superiority 
of post-decisional regret, observed by the authors, 
with mildly depressed students.
Another interesting ﬁ nding from the study by 
Juhos et al. (2003) concerned how emotions (guilt 
and shame) were evaluated after the partici-
pants’ counterfactual thoughts. According to the 
literature (see for example Roese & Olson, 1997), 
upward counterfactuals should induce more neg-
ative emotions because reality is worse than the 
possible worlds considered in the counterfactuals. 
However, Juhos et al. (2003) found that both types 
of thoughts (i.e., factuals and counterfactuals) in 
their study generated identical negative emotions. 
For this reason we think that a possible misleading 
factor in other studies may be the lack of a control 
group, like the one we had that was instructed 
just to summarize the presented scenario (i.e., to 
think factually and not counterfactually) in order 
to obtain a baseline for comparison. On the other 
hand, in the present Experiment 1, in which partici-
pants were invited to think counterfactually about 
three given scenarios, we observed more negative 
associated affects (sadness, feeling negative, feeling 
bad) in participants who made only upward CT in 
comparison with those who made only downward 
CT or both.
Another ﬁ nding from the study by Juhos et al. 
(2003) was that participants think that they are 
more prepared for future similar situations after 
thinking counterfactually than after thinking fac-
tually. What was surprising, and contrary to the 
initial hypotheses, was that the feeling of prepa-
ration after thinking counterfactually about a 
given scenario was observed in the non-depressed 
group as well as in the depressed group (also in 
the present Experiment 1). The proposal that this 
functional aspect of CT should be different in 
depressed people can be found in the literature on 
CT (e.g., Roese & Olson, 1995c; Sherman & McCon-
nell, 1995) and it is congruent with the literature on 
depression (e.g., Beck et al., 1979; Seligman et al., 
1979). So, why in those studies did the depressed 
and non-depressed participants fail to show any 
differences for feelings of preparation? One pos-
sibility is that the result may be due to the type of 
story (scenario) used. However, in the ﬁ rst experi-
ment presented here, these effects were consistent 
across the three different scenarios. 
A second possibility is that scenarios were not 
sufﬁ ciently involving, and that in a real-life situ-
ation one might obtain different results (if not 
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at the cognitive/rational level, at least at the 
behavioural level). It was for this reason that we 
designed Experiment 2, in which a real-life situa-
tion was used instead of a hypothetical scenario, 
and in which we assessed not only the effects of 
CT on cognition (feelings of preparation and of 
being able to avoid a similar negative result in 
the future), but also on behavioural intentions and 
actual behavioural changes 1 week later. Although 
we did not study a clinical sample, for Experiment 
2 we selected students using an even higher cut-
off score on the BDI than we used in Experiment 
1 (scores between 17 and 22). The results showed 
that non-depressed participants felt more prepared 
for future similar situations and more able to avoid 
future similar negative results after CT than before, 
but in contrast neither of these effects was found 
with the depressed participants. Also at the behav-
ioural level, it was observed that the behavioural 
intentions reported by participants (among the 
eight given items) with higher scores were: ‘study 
more’; ‘work harder’; and ‘see the program’. One 
week later, participants were invited to evaluate 
actual behavioural changes in the past week. When 
we checked for signiﬁ cant correlations between 
intentions and actual behavioural changes, these 
were found only for the non-depressed group. 
In general, non-depressed participants intend to 
work harder and are more likely to convert their 
intentions into actual behaviour.
In sum, we think that the involving a real-life 
situation used to study CT in our Experiment 2 
ﬁ nally throws light onto the functional aspects 
of CT in depression. Depressed participants not 
only show a lack of cognitive beneﬁ ts from think-
ing counterfactually (i.e., after CT they do not feel 
more prepared for future similar events, nor able 
to avoid a similar bad outcome, in contrast to the 
non-depressed participants), as well as a lack of 
behavioural changes in the sense of intentions 
to improve. These results ﬁ t with the beliefs of 
depressed people that they are unable to do any-
thing to change their outcomes (see for example 
Marsh & Weary, 1994). Even when they correctly 
identify the cause of the bad outcome (e.g., lack 
of study) and how to improve in the future (e.g., 
to study more), as in Experiment 2, they do not 
beneﬁ t from the feeling of preparation and they 
do not change their behaviour. These ﬁ ndings are 
congruent with the recent study of Markman and 
Miller (2006), in which they found that depressed 
participants obtained no psychological beneﬁ t 
from focusing on how they could prevent a nega-
tive outcome.
In our earlier study (Juhos et al., 2003) we did 
not ﬁ nd differences between depressed and non-
depressed individuals on cognitive and affec-
tive CT consequences. The results suggested that 
depressed individuals beneﬁ t in the same way 
from the preparative function of counterfactual 
thoughts as non-depressed individuals do. There-
fore, we proposed that, in a psychotherapeutic 
context, induced upward CT that results in posi-
tive feelings about the future (e.g., being prepared, 
being able to avoid a failure), could help to over-
come the typically negative vision that depressed 
individuals have about the personal future. 
However, the present results show that all that 
occurs for depressed individuals after upward CT 
is enhanced negative emotion. This effect seems 
to become more strongly marked with an increase 
of severity of depression (e.g., Markman & Miller, 
2006). Therefore, CT may help depressed individu-
als to gain a better understanding of a given situ-
ation (Markman & Weary, 1998), but it does not 
seem to help them feel better about the future, nor 
does it help them to prepare better for the future, 
as we found in Experiment 2.
Finally, these studies will need to be carried 
out with clinically depressed individuals, not just 
mildly depressed students, before we can draw 
ﬁ nal conclusions about the similarities and differ-
ences between the function of CT in depressed and 
non-depressed states. Nevertheless, the current 
ﬁ ndings are consistent with the clinical literature 
on depression that shows that depressed individu-
als may fail to implement skills that are evident 
when they are not depressed, and that they may 
experience a state of helplessness and hopeless-
ness towards the future that they approach with a 
fatalistic sense of foreboding and may bring about 
the very things that they allegedly fear. 
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APPENDIX A: THE THREE STORIES USED IN EXPERIMENT 1
Story 1
When John entered the university, he became immediately a good friend with a girl, one of his col-
leagues. During a party, they spent the whole time together and their kisses showed the passion that 
was growing between them.
At the party, John invited her to go to his apartment that was not very far from the university. Initially 
she refused, but eventually she agreed, though unwilling, giving in due to the persistence of John.
Before they left, John remembered that in the toilet he had seen a machine where he could buy some 
condoms. He asked her to wait a little and went to the toilet to buy a box of condoms, but the machine 
was out of order.
At John’s apartment, everything happened very quickly and the two teenagers made love without using 
a condom. A week later both of them complained that they had a very unpleasant sensation in the genital 
area. After a medical examination, they were told that they had a microbial infection that is transmitted 
through sexual intercourse and the cure for this infection requires medical treatment. 
Story 2
Sarah, a psychology student, had three days to study for the exam of Psychopathology. She knows 
that if she manages her time she can even get a good grade. It is very important for her to have, at least, 
a 12, so that her course average will allow her to choose, next year, the specialization area that she likes 
the most.
Friday, Sarah went to ISPA to copy an important paper in order to study it during the weekend. As 
she entered the building, she remembered that she had to go to the students association and ask if they 
had sample exams from previous years.
When she went to the library, she saw that the library director decided that the library had to be closed 
two hours earlier than usual; this way it was impossible to copy the paper.
The exam turned out badly because she had not read the paper. When she saw the grades, she realised 
that she had only got almost a negative grade.
Story 3
Anna was a close friend of a boy, a high school colleague, for a long time and recently they started to 
date. After they had started to date, they were always together and had many plans for the future.
Meanwhile, Anna decided that in August they would not spend their holidays together as a way of 
testing the trust in their relationship.
Anna’s boyfriend, a little annoyed with her decision, decided that he would not answer her phone 
calls during that month.
When they met again in September, she was informed that he had found himself another girlfriend 
in August; this led to an intense discussion between them. Though they broke up, they continued to be 
friends. 
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APPENDIX B: MATERIALS FOR EXPERIMENT 2
In Experiment 2, participants received a book containing:
• On page 1 Participant identiﬁ cation: age, gender and student number.
• On page 2 Evaluation of general emotional state (how good do you feel? 1—not at all, 9—very 
much; how bad do you feel, same ratings); evaluation of the intensity of speciﬁ c emo-
tions chosen from a list of 12 emotions (self-realization, satisfaction, happiness, joy, 
conﬁ dence, hope, regret, sadness, guilt, disappointment, shame, anger; 1—minim., 
9—max.).
• On page 3 Participants are asked to record ﬁ ve spontaneous thoughts that occurred to them right 
after they were informed of the result.
• On page 4 Participants evaluate their feelings in relation to being prepared for a similar situation 
in the future and in relation to their ability to avoid future negative results. Intensity 
of feelings was measured on a nine-point rating scale, where the extremes were: 1—I 
do not agree at all and 9—I agree completely. In both cases participants were asked to 
justify their ratings.
• On page 5 Participants evaluated the intensity of emotion on a nine-point rating scale (1—minim; 
9—max). They began with general emotions (feeling good/bad) and then chose speciﬁ c 
emotions from the same list of 12 as on page 2.
• On page 6 Participants were induced to think counterfactually about the situation and then write 
down their thoughts.
• On page 7 Participants were asked how prepared they feel for the future and how capable they 
feel to avoid future negative results after thinking about how things could have been 
different (ratings on nine-point scales). Participants were asked to justify their ratings.
• On page 8 Same as page 5.
• On page 9 Participants recorded their behavioural intentions using nine point rating scales (1—
certainly won’t do this; 9—certainly will do this) on items like ‘Study more’, ‘Work 
harder’ and ‘Guide my study using the program of the course’.
